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RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE: INDECENT, INCITEFUL AND
HATEFUL SPEECH
The First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution guarantees the right to free speech and to a
free press.1 However, these rights are regularly pro-
scribed when applied to certain forms of speech that
have been held to have no, or less than absolute,
First Amendment protection.2 Speech that is inde-
cent,3 incites unlawful action,' and "arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender"5 represents three ar-
eas where a constant tension exists between the First
Amendment's protection of speech and the Govern-
ment's responsibility to the public to protect it from
substantial harm. 6
How broadly are the guaranteed First Amend-
ment protections applied when they conflict with the
government's compelling interests? Does the protec-
tion of the First Amendment relieve a radio station
of responsibility for airing indecent programming?
Does the First Amendment, likewise, excuse a maga-
zine that publishes a "gun for hire" advertisement
resulting in death? And finally, does the First
Amendment protect a cross burner's "speech" when
it victimizes the recipient family?
This Comment explores each of these three issues
in turn. Beginning with an examination of the evolu-
tion of indecency regulation, this Comment will
bring into focus the status of indecent speech today
and the questions this issue poses for the future.
Next, the media's liability for harm resulting from
' Specifically, the Constitution mandates that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' Even Justice Hugo Black, a First Amendment "absolu-
tist," balanced the protection of speech with community inter-
ests. See, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,
165 (1966).
' See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also Ac-
tion for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992)[hereinafter ACT 11].
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)[hereinafter ACT 11; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978).
4 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)(advocacy
of imminent lawless behavior); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
the exercise of its First Amendment right to commer-
cial speech will be addressed. Finally, the constitu-
tionality of city ordinances and university codes that
attempt to regulate "hate speech" following the deci-
sion in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul is discussed.' This
Comment concludes by underscoring the continuing
need to strike a balance between First Amendment
guarantees and liabilities.
I. INDECENCY AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT: SAVE IT 'TIL AFTER MIDNIGHT
A. The Evolution of Indecency Regulation
Originally, federal law prohibited the broadcast of
any obscene, indecent, or profane language.8 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has subsequently held that
broadcast indecency is afforded constitutional protec-
tion as long as it is subject to the restriction of being
"channeled" to air time that reduces the risk of chil-
dren being in the listening audience.' To enforce
that restriction, the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC" or "Commission") relied on 18
U.S.C. § 1464, which empowered the Commission
to take regulatory action when it determined that a
broadcast contains indecent material." Although the
Commission may exercise some prosecutorial discre-
tion, generally it is obligated to act on indecency
complaints generated by the public. The Commission
315 U.S. 568 (1942)(fighting words).
' R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2541 (1992).
6 For the purpose of this Comment, "Government" refers to
agencies of the federal government, such as the Federal Commu-
nication Commission, and state government as well.
1 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
8 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988). Specifically, the statute states
that "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane lan-
guage by means of radio communication shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both."Id.
' In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Inde-
cency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 7
FCC Rcd. 6464, para 4 (1992)[hereinafter Enforcement of
Prohibitions Notice]; see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
1o 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE
exercises this regulatory power by assessing mone-
tary forfeitures or, in extreme cases, revoking a sta-
tion's broadcast license. 1 However, the Commission
may not engage in censorship or promulgate regula-
tions "which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication."12
In 1975, the Commission defined indecent speech
as "language that describes, in terms patently offen-
sive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
activities and organs."' 3 In analyzing whether par-
ticular material meets that definition, the Commis-
sion examines the "context" in which the language is
presented.14 "Context" encompasses a "host of vari-
ables," including: an examination of the words to de-
termine if they are "vulgar" or "shocking," a review
of the circumstances in which the language is por-
trayed, an analysis of whether the material is iso-
lated or fleeting, a consideration of the ability of the
medium to separate adult listeners from children, a
determination of the presence of children in the lis-
tening audience, and the merits of the work.' 5
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,' the Supreme
Court upheld the Commission's generic definition of
indecency under section 1464 as applied to a radio
11 Enforcement of Prohibitions Notice, supra note 9, para. 3
(citing 47 U.S.C. 312(a)-(b), 503(b)(1)(D) (1988)).
12 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988). Specifically, the statute states
that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be understood or construed
to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
communications ...and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication."Id.
12 In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975). The
Commission's definition of indecency has been upheld most re-
cently in ACT II, relying on the court's prior decision in ACT I
and the Supreme Court decision in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50.
14 In Re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 930, 932, paras. 16,
17 (1987)[hereinafter Infinity], atFd in part and remanded in
part sub nom. ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
18 Id. paras. 16, 17.
18 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
17 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738-41. The monologue had been
broadcast on a Tusday afternoon on Pacifica Foundation's New
York radio station, WBAL-(FM), preceded by only a disclaimer
that listeners might find the broadcast offensive and they should
change the station for fifteen minutes. Id. Included in the
monologue:
The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cock-
sucker, motherfucker, and tits . . . [A]nd now the first
thing that we noticed was that the word fuck was really
repeated in there because the word motherfucker is a com-
pound word and it's another form of the word fuck ....
Id. at 751.
18 Id.
station's afternoon broadcast of a George Carlin
comedy monologue entitled "Filthy Words.'1 7 En-
forcement was restricted to broadcasts before 10:00
p.m. containing words "identical" or "similar" to
those in the Carlin "Filthy Words" monologue that
were aired strictly for shock value.'" After Pacifica,
not one broadcast was found actionable under the
Commission's narrow interpretation of its indecency
policy until 1987." a Having determined that the
"highly restrict[ive] enforcement standard" employed
since the Pacifica holding "was unduly narrow as a
matter of law and inconsistent with [the FCC's] en-
forcement responsibilities under section 1464," the
Commission issued three rulings declaring material
indecent.20 Because that same material would not
have violated the "Filthy Words" test, the Commis-
sion clarified that its definition of indecency went be-
yond repeated expletives and that those violations fit
squarely within its revised standard.2 '
KPFK-(FM) Los Angeles, California, received a
warning for its 10:00 p.m. broadcast of excerpts
from the Jerker, a play which addressed coping with
the acquired immune deficiency syndrome and facing
death."2 KCSB-(FM) Santa Barbara, California,
was cited for its broadcast of a sexually graphic song
19 ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
20 Infinity, supra note 14, para. 5 at 930. The Commission
found that KPFK-(FM), KCSB-(FM) and WYSP-(FM) had
broadcast indecent materials during a time when there was a
reasonable risk that children were in the audience. See Pacifica
Found., 2 FCC Red. 2698 (1987)(KPFK-(FM)); The Regents
of the University of California, 2 FCC Rcd. 2703
(1987)(KCSB-(FM)); Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 2
FCC Rcd. 2705 (1987)(WYSP-(FM)). Upon finding that the
licensees reasonably believed that it was permissible to air their
broadcasts, the Commission declined to take any enforcement ac-
tion, and instead limited itself to warning licensees that future
broadcasts would be actionable under the revised enforcement
standards. Infinity, supra note 14, para. 6 at 931.
21 ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1506. The Commission found two of
the broadcasts indecent despite the fact that they were aired after
10:00 p.m. The FCC justified that finding stating that "mid-
night was its 'current thinking' as to when the risk of children in
the broadcast audience could reasonably be minimized." Id.
(quoting Infinity, supra note 14, at 937 n.47). See Pacifica
Found., 2 FCC Red. 2698 (1987); The Regents of the Univer-
sity of California, 2 FCC Rcd. 2703 (1987); Infinity Broadcast-
ing Corp. of Pennsylvania, 2 FCC Rcd. 2705 (1987). See also
New Indecency Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and
Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 FCC Rcd. 2726 (1987).
22 Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Red. at 2700-1 paras. 19-23. De-
spite a station warning to listeners that the broadcast might be
found disturbing, the FCC declared that future broadcasts of
similar material would be actionable under the new indecency
standard. Id. The material found indecent included excerpts
such as, "[y]eah, it was loving even if you didn't know whose
cock it was in the dark or whose asshole you were sucking." Id.
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called "Makin' Bacon" which was aired without
warning just after 10:00 p.m.23 The FCC warned
that even airing objectionable programming after
10:00 p.m. was no longer sufficient to ensure that
children were not listening to the broadcast."4 And
WYSP-(FM) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was
warned for a number of Howard Stern morning
show broadcasts containing sexual innuendo.
2 5
Those actions taken by the Commission
culminated in Action for Children's Television v.
FCC ("ACT 1"),26 where the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed the
Commission's generic definition of indecency."7 Hav-
ing concluded that a reasonable "safe harbor" rule
was constitutionally mandated, the court remanded
ACT I so that the Commission could conduct a
hearing to determine the hours at which indecent
material could be broadcast.28 However, before the
Commission could act on the remand, President
George Bush signed into law an appropriations bill
that mandated a twenty-four hour ban on all inde-
cent broadcasts." Pursuant to that law, the Commis-
para. 20 at 2700.
23 The Regents of the University of California, 2 FCC Rcd.
2703 (1987). The lyrics of "Makin' Bacon," aired shortly after
10:00 p.m. without any warning of indecency included, "(A] ten-
inch cropper with a varicose vein. Makin' bacon is on my mind.
Come here baby, make it quick, Kneel down there and suck my
dick." Id. para. 4 at 2703.
, Id. at 2704.
2 Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 FCC Rcd. 2705, 2706
(1987). The FCC found that sexual innuendo and double enten-
dre may be actionable if they are "intermingled with explicit
references that make the meaning of the entire discussion clear
or capable only of one meaning." Id. para. 9 at 2706. For exam-
ple, an excerpt from Stern's morning radio show:
Howard Stern: Have you ever had sex with an
animal?
Caller: No.
Howard Stern: Well, don't knock it. I was
sodomized by Lambchop, you know that puppet
Sherri Lewis holds? . . .Baaaah. That's where I
was thinking that Sherrie Lewis instead of like
sodomizing all the people at the Academy to get
that shot on the Emmy's she could've had
Lambchop do it.
Id. para. 11 at 2706.
26 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
2 Id. at 1343. In ACT I, broadcasters petitioned the court
for review of an order of the Commission adopting a generic
definition of indecency. They also challenged the decision of the
Commission to channel broadcasting of indecent materials be-
tween midnight and 6:00 a.m. The court upheld the definition of
indecency, but stated that the Commission did not adequately
justify its new, more restrictive approach to curtailing the hours
at which indecent material could be broadcast. Id. at 1341-42.
The court concluded that the Commission must give broadcasters
sion promulgated a new rule under section 1464
prohibiting all broadcasts of indecent material. 30 As
a result, the Commission abandoned its notice and
comment proceedings to determine a "safe harbor"
period, thereby denying the public a right to express
its views.3 ' Lead by Action for Children's Televi-
sion, 2 seventeen media citizen groups seeking to stay
the beginning of the indecency ban successfully ap-
pealed the FCC order to the District Court of Co-
lumbia Circuit. 3
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court in Sable Commu-
nications of California, Inc. v. FCC4 held that a
blanket ban on indecent commercial telephone mes-
sage services was unconstitutional.35 Despite the ma-
jority's intimation in Sable that a blanket ban on in-
decency was unconstitutional, the Commission
nevertheless interpreted dictum in Justice Scalia's
concurrence as suggesting that a twenty-four hour
ban on a particular medium (here radio) might be
upheld if it could be shown that there was no feasi-
ble alternative for protecting minors.3
Beginning with a solicitation of public comments,
clear notice of when indecent material may be broadcast. Id.
2 See ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1506 (quoting ACT I at 1343).
The court also vacated the Commission ruling that the two post-
10:00 p.m. broadcasts were indecent. Id.
2 Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988).
"o See In re Enforcement of Prohibition Against Broadcast
Obscenity and Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 4 FCC Red. 457
(1988)[hereinafter Enforcement of Prohibition Order]. In a sep-
arate statement, Commissioner Patricia Diaz Dennis stated that
prior rulings "suggest that the courts would not uphold an out-
right ban on the broadcast of indecent speech." Id. at 458. Den-
nis questioned the constitutionality of the mandated appropria-
tions bill. Nevertheless, because it was a congressional mandate,
she concurred in the Commission's decision. Id.
31 ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1507 (citing Enforcement of Prohi-
bition Order, 4 FCC Red. at 457).
3' Action for Children's Television ("ACT") is a national
nonprofit organization that works to encourage diversity in chil-
dren's television and to eliminate commercial abuses targeted at
children. See generally Action for Children's Television's mis-
sion. ACT initiates legal reforms and promotes awareness of
children's television issues through public education campaigns,
publications, national conferences and speaking engagements.
3 Richard G. Passler, Regulation of Indecent Radio Broad-
casts: George Carlin Revisited-What Does the Future Hold for
the Seven "Dirty" Words?, 65 TUL. L. REv. 131, 147 (1990).
34 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
85 Id. In Sable, the Commission imposed a blanket prohibi-
tion on indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone
messages. The Supreme Court upheld the prohibition on obscen-
ity, but held, denial of adult access to indecent messages was
overbroad in that it far exceeded what was necessary to limit a
minor's access. Id. at 131.
3' Id. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the Commission, on July 12, 1990, issued a report
concluding that a twenty-four hour prohibition on
indecent broadcasts was constitutional under the
standard enunciated in Sable.37 The Commission de-
termined that since children aged seventeen and
under listen to radio and view television at all times
without parental supervision, no alternative to a total
ban would effectuate the government's compelling
interest in protecting children from broadcast
indecency.
38
One year later, on May 17, 1991, the District of
Columbia Circuit found the congressionally man-
dated twenty-four hour ban on indecency unconstitu-
tional in Action for Children's Television v. FCC
("ACT I1").3' Although the Commission's generic
definition of indecency comported with constitutional
vagueness and overbreadth requirements, the court
concluded that broadcast material that was indecent,
but not obscene, was protected by the First Amend-
ment.40 The court concluded that its decision in
ACT 11 effectively returned the Commission to the
position it briefly held after ACT I and prior to the
congressional adoption of the appropriation rider
and the twenty-four hour ban.41 Simply put, the
government could not ban indecent broadcasts alto-
gether; rather, it had to find a time period, a "safe
harbor," during which the risk of exposure to chil-
dren was minimized and such broadcasts would be
permitted.4 2
B. Indecency in Flux
Indecency regulation was once again in flux, re-
quiring new routes of action to resolve the indecency
"safe harbor" question. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in ACT II, letting stand the decision that a
twenty-four hour ban on indecency was unconstitu-
tional."' While Congress tried to construct a new
law restricting the times during which one could
broadcast indecency, the Commission increased the
" In re Enforcement of Prohibition Against Broadcast Inde-
cency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 FCC Rcd. 5297, para. 2 (1990)
[hereinafter 1990 Report]. The Commission received over 92,500
formal and informal submissions. Enforcement of Prohibitions
Notice, supra note 9, para. 7.
38 1990 Report, supra note 37, para. 65 at 5297, 5306.
3 ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1510.
40 Id. at 1506.
41 Id. at 1510.
42 Enforcement of Prohibitions Notice, supra note 9, para. 4.
43 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 112 S. Ct. 1282
(1992).
44 Id.
frequencies of fines levied in administrative proceed-
ings for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
1. Judicial, Legislative and Executive Action: The
Indecency Merry-Go-Round
On March 2, 1992, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Children's Legal Foundation v. Action
for Children's Television,"' thus leaving in effect the
decision in ACT I1 holding a twenty-four hour ban
on indecency unconstitutional. Despite the combined
holdings of ACT I and ACT I--that a 6:00 a.m. to
midnight ban and a twenty-four hour ban were both
unconstitutional unless and until the FCC could jus-
tify the government's compelling interest in protect-
ing minors from indecent broadcasts-the Senate on
June 3, 1992, passed S. 1504.4' This bill, entitled
the Public Telecommunications Act of 1991 ("the
Act"), included an amendment that once again pro-
posed a "safe harbor" indecency ban on all commer-
cial broadcast stations and many non-commercial
stations between 6:00 a.m. and midnight. 6 Section
16(a) of the Act authorized the Commission to pro-
mulgate regulations prohibiting the broadcasting of
indecent programming between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00
p.m. on stations going off the air by midnight and
between 6:00 a.m. and 12:00 a.m. for all other
stations.47
Incorporating the Senate amendments, the House
of Representatives passed the same bill on August 4,
1992.48 On August 26, 1992, President Bush signed
the Public Telecommunications Act of 1991 into
law. ' 9 On September 17, 1992, the FCC began a
proceeding to implement the congressionally man-
dated regulations prohibiting the broadcasting of in-
decent programming.5" The focus of the proceeding
was "confined to the matter of updating the Com-
mission's [factual] record with regard to the presence
of children in the viewing and listening audience. '""i
48 S. 1504, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
46 Id.
41 Id. § 16(a).
48 H.R. 2977, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
48 Public Telecommunications Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-356 (1992).
80 Enforcement of Prohibitions Notice, supra note 9, para. 9.
01 Id. para. 12. To quote Commissioner Sherrie P. Mar-
shall, "this statute and our proposed rules fully comport with
existing judicial interpretations of the First Amendment." Id.
However, until factual support to substantiate that claim is col-
lected, it remains to be seen whether or not a midnight to 6:00
a.m. ban is constitutional.
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2. Commission Action: You Can't Say That on the
Radio
Following ACT 1, the Commission embarked on
an "anti-indecency campaign" in which it increased
its review of indecency complaints. 52 Pursuant to
Sections 312(a)(6) and 503(b)(1)(D) of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934,53 the Commission has statu-
tory authority to take appropriate administrative ac-
tion when licensees broadcast material in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1464. The process begins when the
FCC is notified of an alleged violation. The Com-
mission drafts and sends a letter of inquiry to which
a station has thirty days to respond with comments
and questions.54 If the Commission determines a vio-
lation exists, it usually issues a Notice of Apparent
Liability ("NAL") for a monetary forfeiture with
the standard fine being $12,500." 5 A Notice of For-
feiture ("NOF") follows, and a licensee who ulti-
mately fails to pay the forfeiture may face prosecu-
tion by the Department of Justice.56
On January 28, 1991, the Mass Media Bureau
found Evergreen Media Corporation, licensee of
WLUP-(AM), Chicago, Illinois ("Evergreen"), in
violation of section 1464 and imposed a monetary
forfeiture of $6,000 which Evergreen ultimately re-
fused to pay. 57 On October 10, 1991, the Commis-
sion denied Evergreen's petition for reconsideration,
finding that a segment of the "Steve and Garry [talk]
52 Harry A. Jessell, FCC Puts Broadcasters on Notice for
Indecency, BROADCASTING, March 2, 1992, at 29. Each year
the Commission receives thousands of complaints from viewers.
However it only considers the few complaints that are accompa-
nied by tapes or transcripts of the alleged offense. The Commis-
sion has received 53 such complaints in the past six months. Id.
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)-(b), § 503(b)(1)(D).
5 Jessell, supra note 52, at 29.
5 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2); Policy Statement on Standards for
Assessing Forfeitures, 6 FCC Rcd. 4695, appendix (1991).
56 See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(B). Instead of initiating action
by the Justice Department to collect a forfeiture, the Commis-
sion may hold a forfeiture hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge, or, in appropriate cases, hold a license revocation
hearing.
57 In re Liability of Evergreen Media Corp. of Chicago,
AM, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 502, para.
1 (1991). Evergreen argued the forfeiture was time-barred, and
challenged the Commission's findings of indecency. On March
30, 1989, at 5:10 p.m. dee jay Steve Dahl stated, "[Vanessa Wil-
liams] went down on that other woman and oh God, you had
your tongue in her vagina . . . It was fabulous ..... Id. at
Attachment 1.
"' In re Petition for Reconsideration Concerning the Liabil-
ity of Evergreen Media Corp. of Chicago, AM, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5950, para. 9 (1991).
'9 Id. The Commission distinguished the "Steve and Garry
Show . . .describing sexual activities of Vanessa
Williams as depicted in Penthouse magazine" was
"vulgar material presented in a pandering and titil-
lating manner . . ."" The Commission rejected Ev-
ergreen's contention that its broadcast was no more
indecent than National Public Radio's "All Things
Considered" newscast on "an underworld figure
whose wiretapped conversations included [repeated]
expletives." 59 On August 19, 1992, the Commission,
through the Department of Justice, initiated a civil
proceeding against Evergreen for failure to pay its
$6,000 forfeiture.
During that same period, the FCC initiated a
multitude of slap-on-the-wrist fines against radio
stations nationwide. Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc., li-
censee of WVIC-(FM) East Lansing, Michigan, re-
ceived a forfeiture of $2,000 for a segment on the
"Michaels in the Morning Show" where "[o]n-air
personalities used explicit, vulgar language and re-
peatedly solicited audience contributions in the same
vein."' Similarly, WYBB-(FM) Folly Beach, South
Carolina, was fined $3,750 for a broadcast where the
station's morning team repeatedly said "crap" and
"shit" on the air."' And KFMH-(FM) Muscatine,
Iowa, and WWZZ-(FM) Knoxville, Tennessee, re-
ceived letters of inquiry for alleged indecent broad-
casts. KFMH was cited for two jokes aired August
30, 1991 on its morning program-one about oral
sex and the other about female genitalia.1
2 WWZZ
Show," a politically and socially oriented talk show, from a news
program, concluding that in that context NPR's newscast was
not indecent. See Letter to Peter Branton, 6 FCC Rcd. 610
(1991).
60 In re Liability of Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc., Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 7484, para. 6 (1991). The
Commission determined that the material did not constitute
news programming, nor was it presented in a manner that was
either pandering or titillating. Id. On September 27, 1989, at
6:00 a.m., dee jay Michaels aired "Maybe a listener has an idea
for a headline because this [news story] really didn't have one..
• Michael Aleman ... was having his honeymoon . . . [a]nd he
was plunged into terror when his left testicle was sucked into a
hot tub drain ...." Id. at Attachment 2.
"' Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief MM, to L.M. Com-
munications of South Carolina, Inc. (WYBB-(FM)), 7 FCC
Rcd. 1595 (1992). The Commission held that "[the] deliberate
and repetitive use of the word 'crap' to heighten the audience's
awareness of and attention to the subsequent use of the term
'shit' by the announcer," was wilfully focused and not an inci-
dental remark. Id.
62 See Jessell, supra note 52, at 29. In that situation callers
with jokes had passed through a pre-screening process. How-
ever, once on the air, the callers changed their jokes. The station
quickly apologized and afterwards prerecorded callers' jokes
prior to airing them. Id.
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was cited for a station promotion that ridiculed the
"shrinking 'testicles' of a rival station," announcing,
"It takes balls to rock hard; Z-93-we keep it
harder, longer."63
As these examples illustrate, initially forfeitures
involved such small amounts of money that most sta-
tions likely considered them a cost of doing business.
However, this trend of moderately priced punitive
forfeitures was soon to change.
Two California stations, KGB and KMEL, re-
ceived NAL's of $25,000 each. On May 26, 1992,
KGB, licensee of KGB-(FM) San Diego, California,
was given an NAL for two songs broadcast during
its "Friday Morning Blow-Out Show" on February
23, March 16, and April 13, 1990, at 8:00 a.m.
6
1
The Commission, in justifying that substantial for-
feiture, maintained "the violation in this case [was]
exacerbated . . . because the broadcast of indecent
material was repeated and, with respect to the
broadcast of the song 'Candy Wrapper,' was egre-
gious, given the prior Commission determination
that that particular material was indecent."65 Like-
wise, on July 24, 1992, an NAL was issued to San
Francisco radio station KMEL-(FM) for broadcast-
ing indecent material during the "Rick Chase" show
63 Id.
64 Letter from Donna R. Searcy, Secretary, to KGB, Inc.,
San Diego, California, 7 FCC Rcd. 3207 (1992). The "Candy
Wrapper" song had been previously found indecent by the Com-
mission. See Letter from Roy J. Steward, Chief, Mass Media
Bureau, WIOD, Inc., 6 FCC Rcd. 3704 (1989). Aired February
23, 1990 at 8:37 a.m., the lyrics of the "Candy Wrapper" in-
cluded this excerpt:
It was another Pay Day and I was tired of
being a Mr. Goodbar, when I saw Miss
Hershey standing behind the Powerhouse on
the corner of Clark and Fifth Avenue, I
whipped out my Whopper and whispered,
Hey Sweettart, how'd you like to Crunch on
my Big Hunk for a Million Dollar Bar?...
[I]t was all I could do to hold back a Snicker
and a Krackle as my Butterfinger went up
her tight little Kit Kat, and she started to
scream Oh, Henry! ...
Id. at 3208.
65 Letter from Donna R. Searcy, Secretary, to KGB, Inc.,
San Diego, California, 7 FCC Rcd. 3207 (1992).
6 Letter from Donna R. Searcy, Secretary, to San Francisco
Century Broadcasting, San Francisco, California, 7 FCC Rcd.
4858 (1992). Forfeiture for $25,000 was imposed for the full
amount in response to broadcasts from 2:00 to 6:00 p.m. during
the months of August and September 1991. Id. To one caller,
dee jay Rick Chase inquired, "Have you ever had oral sex? ...
Maybe you're too ugly to have oral sex." Id. at 4858.
67 Claudia Puig, KLSX Owner Responds to FCC's Howard
Stern Fine, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 1, 1993 at F-2. Twelve
alleged instances from October through December 1991 brought
on various dates between August 20 and September
16, 1991.66
Those costly monetary forfeitures were just the
beginning. On October 27, 1991, Greater Media,
owner of KLSX-(FM) Los Angeles, California, was
issued an NAL in the amount of $105,000 for inde-
cent broadcasts aired during various Howard Stern
morning shows.6 7 On January 4, 1993, KLSX sent a
thirty-six page response to the FCC contending that
the NAL was issued without giving KLSX an op-
portunity to respond to the complaint.6" KLSX ar-
gued that the Commission standard was vague and
did not indicate what portion of the transcript it
found to be indecent.
6 9
Most recently, on December 18, 1992, by a unani-
mous Commission vote, Infinity Broadcasting was
informed of its apparent liability of $600,000 for si-
multaneously broadcasting the same material for
which KLSX had received an NAL earlier in Octo-
ber 1992.70 Three Infinity owned stations, Philadel-
phia's WYSP-(FM), New York's WXRK-(FM)
and Washington's WJFK-(FM), were issued NAL's
of $200,000 each.7" Interest groups favoring the in-
decency restrictions lobbied the Commission for the
harsher penalty of preventing Infinity's purchase of
on the costly forfeiture. Id. The broadcasts in contention in-
cluded repeated references to masturbation, rape, erections,
penises, homosexual and heterosexual sexual activity, Santa
Claus fondling children, a technique for elongating the male sex-
ual organ, a concoction by Stern of a fictional rape, and a castra-
tion of two Los Angeles radio competitors. Paul Farhi, FCC's
Stern Punishment; Radio Group to Be Fined, Purchases May
Be Delayed, WASH. PosT, Nov. 25, 1992 at p. El. Although
$12,500 is the standard fine, the FCC may impose fines of
$25,000 per day up to $250,000. In re Standards for Assessing
Forfeitures, Policy Statement, 6 FCC Rcd. 4695, 4697, appen-
dix (1991).
6 Largest Fine Ever, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, December
21, 1992, Vol. 12, No. 245, p.2.
6 Id.
70 Pat Widder, 'Shock Jock' Stern lands record fine for In-
finity Broadcasting, CHic. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1992, at p. 1-C. In-
finity had received a letter of inquiry from the FCC regarding
broadcasts of three Infinity-owned stations to which Infinity re-
plied affirmatively that it had broadcast the material in question.
See also Letter from Donna R. Searcy, Secretary, to WSUC-
FM, Cortland, N.Y., 8 FCC Rcd. 2 (1993). In that situation,
State University of New York was issued an NAL for $23,750
on January 1, 1993, for a broadcast of rap music that contained
alleged vulgar language including "no joking, my tongue just
keeps on poking, and the best type of oochie coochie is the type
that tastes like sushi, eat it, watch your girl get frisky and then
wash it down with a shot of whiskey . . . ." Id.
"' Largest Fine Ever, supra note 68, at 2. After issuing an




three new stations.72 However, by a four-to-one vote,
the Commission approved the pending sale because
the seller, Cook Inlet Radio Partners of Alaska, was
a minority-owned and controlled company that was
never before in trouble with the FCC.
73
Infinity has asked the Commission to reconsider
its finding of indecency. 74 Like Evergreen, however,
non-payment by Infinity may ultimately lead to ac-
tion by the Justice Department to collect the fine.75
Even so, Infinity is determined to defend its non-
payment of the forfeiture on two grounds.76 First,
Infinity hopes to show that the material focused on is
not indecent and second, it hopes to prove through a
Gallup Poll that the Stern broadcast audience does
not include any unsupervised child listeners.
77
The outcome in both Evergreen and Infinity will
be greatly determinative of the future of broadcast
indecency. Monetary forfeitures were intended to
lead to increased self-regulation by radio stations. If
forfeitures continue to rise in cost, radio stations will
have to weigh the benefit they receive in airing po-
tentially indecent broadcasts against the money they
are expending in forfeitures. Although "shock
jocks,"7" such as Howard Stern, appear to be con-
tributing to higher ratings, stations repeatedly forced
to put "their money where their [dee jay's] mouth is"
may encourage stricter adherence to indecency stan-
dards. However, when shock jocks collect $3,000 for
every sixty second commercial advertisement aired
during their show - which is broadcast four to five
hours daily, five days a week - forfeitures in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars may be deemed as
just another cost of doing business.
3. Indecency on the Horizon: What's Next?
There is speculation that the composition and mis-
sion of the FCC will change as replacements are ap-
pointed for Republican Chairman Alfred Sikes and
Commissioner Sherrie Marshall.7 9 Some contend
that unlike former President Bush, President Clinton
will not face the same conservative pressures, thus
72 Id.
71 Id. Other, more traditional reasons for upholding the sale
were discussed in the opinion. Id.




78 "Shock jock" is a slang term used to describe dee jays who
air provocative, controversial, and often-times indecent
programming.
79 Paul Farhi, FCC's Stern Rebuke; Infinity Unrepentant;
Harsher Actions Loom, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1992, Style, p.
allowing indecency to be dealt a more liberal hand.
However, others maintain that Vice President Gore
and his wife Tipper will perpetuate the conservative
agenda followed during Chairman Sikes' tenure. 80
How will the future Commission respond to the
emerging pattern of refusals to pay forfeitures,
where stations are forcing the FCC's hand by taking
the questions of indecency to federal court? Once in
court, the FCC may no longer rely on the subjective
interpretations of the five-member Commission, but
rather, the FCC itself must prove the material is in-
decent. Previously, stations have avoided court bat-
tles with the Commission, in part, because they may
have feared the subtle powers of the FCC who con-
trol license renewals, as well as other important ser-
vices. Additionally, going to court is not particularly
attractive where the expense of litigation may exceed
the fine itself. However, the cases of Evergreen and
Infinity may indicate a trend toward reducing such
conflicts in the courtroom. First, with the indecency
definition unsettled, they have nothing to lose in
court. Secondly, as the size of fines steadily increases,
litigation may become the cheaper alternative. If the
courts do not resolve the onslaught of alleged inde-
cency violations, the future Commission, as suggested
by Commissioner James Quello, may institute pro-
ceedings to consider revoking "all or some" of a sta-
tion's broadcasting licenses if an aggravated pattern
of repeated violations occurs. 8'
In light of the extensive involvement of the FCC,
the Congress and the courts, the following question
has yet to be answered: where is the line to be drawn
regarding the broadcaster's First Amendment right
to air material of his choice and the listener's right to
receive uncensored broadcasts versus the govern-
ment's compelling interest in prohibiting indecency
over the public airwaves?
The FCC's present paternalistic objective to pro-
tect children from indecent broadcasts through the
five commissioners may no longer be a valid exercise
of its discretion. The "harm to children" argument's
time has seemingly passed. Where parents, and for
D1.
"o Tipper Gore was a principle architect of a national cam-
paign to place warning labels on record albums containing ex-
plicit lyrics. In addition, during a 1989 Congressional hearing
with FCC nominees Alfred Sikes, Andrew Barrett and Sherrie
Marshall, Al Gore was among the most outspoken Senators stat-
ing his distaste for broadcast indecency and his hope that the
Commission would regulate it according to Congress' mandate.
Congress Asserts Its Dominion Over FCC, BROADCASTING,
Aug. 7, 1989, at 27.
" Widder, supra note 70, at 12.
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that matter, anyone in general, have the power to
turn off the radio or change the dial, five commis-
sioners need not subjectively dictate what can and
cannot be broadcast. It might be time to acknowledge
that if the public owns the broadcast airways and the
public votes radio personalities like Howard Stern
number one in two cities, with high ratings in eight
others, then the public is sending a message to the
FCC, the Congress and the courts about our na-
tional community's evolving contemporary standards
of decency.82
II. BODILY INJURY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: GUNS FOR HIRE BUL-
LET THE MEDIA'S RIGHTS
A. Fishing for a Standard
As evidenced above, indecency regulation is still
somewhat unsettled. Likewise, it is unclear to what
extent the First Amendment's protection of freedom
of speech and of the press shields a media defendant
from civil liability for damages arising from bodily
injuries caused by speech.83 The courts have bor-
rowed from libel law the proposition that the imposi-
tion of tort liability by the State is subject to consti-
tutional limitation to prevent the inhibition of free
speech. 4 The courts have also borrowed from the
law of incitement, which limits speech "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and..
. likely to produce such action."85 Additionally, the
"clear and present danger"86 standard has been in-
voked allowing recovery for liability if the injury is
foreseeable and the result of a clear and present
82 Stern, according to Arbitron, is rated number one in New
York and Los Angeles. He is number two in Philadelphia and
number four in Washington. Ted Koppel, Raunch Radio: How
Far Is Too Far, ABC NEws NIGHTLINE, Dec. 17, 1992.
83 Alan Stephens, Annotation, First Amendment Guaranty
of Freedom of Speech or Press as a Defense to Liability Stem-
ming from Speech Allegedly Causing Bodily Injury, 94 A.L.R.
FED. 26, at 29 (1991).
84 Id. at 29 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964)).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
86 Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
87 Stephens, supra note 83, at 30, 31 (citing Olivia N. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383 (1977)).
88 Id. at 32 (citing Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d
36 (Cal. 1975)).
88 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981).
80 Id. at 492. In defendant's film, "Born Innocent," one
scene depicted a young girl entering a shower where she is artifi-
cially raped and attacked by four other adolescent girls using a
"plumber's helper." Id.
danger.
Generally, where the motivation for the harmful
act was a television broadcast or movie that was not
oriented toward the commission of any specific act by
the audience, liability has been barred by the First
Amendment. 7 But, where the media directly en-
couraged the action that resulted in harm, the courts
have refused to invoke the freedoms of speech or
press to deny the injured plaintiff recourse.88 The
distinction is often hard to draw.
1. Liability Barred: Speech Above Injury!
In Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co.,89 the
First Amendment protected broadcasters who aired a
television drama that resulted in the attack and rape
of a girl by minors who were allegedly motivated by
having viewed a similar attack depicted in the de-
fendant's film.80 In upholding the incitement stan-
dard articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio,1 the court
declined to impose a lesser standard of negligence on
the broadcasters because "television networks would
become more inhibited in the selection of controver-
sial materials."92 Furthermore, a negligence standard
"would lead to self-censorship, which would dampen
the vigor and limit the public variety of debate."
'93
Likewise, in Bill v. Supreme Court,14 a minor
plaintiff was shot while leaving a movie theater that
had aired a violent picture.95 Again the court rejected
a simple negligence theory and upheld the incitement
standard.9" The court feared that if the negligence
theory was upheld, prospective film producers of vio-
lent movies would be required to account for "liabil-
ity to patrons for acts of violence on the part of third
81 Stephens, supra note 83, at 494-95.
82 Id. at 494. The court recognized that the First Amend-
ment was not absolute; however, it held that "Born Innocent"
was well within the realm of protected speech. Id.
" Id. (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279 (1964)). The court feared that by imposing less than the
incitement standard on media defendants would "reduce the
U.S. adult population to viewing only what was fit for children."
Id. at 494-495.
84 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002 (1982).
98 Plaintiff sued the producers of the movie for negligence in
knowing that the movie was violent, that it was likely to attract
violence-prone people who would cause injury to "movie goers,"
and that the producers negligently failed to warn "movie goers"
of those facts. Id. at 1005.
88 See Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 276
S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981)(denying relief to a minor who duplicated
Mickey Mouse Club Show magic trick and was injured);
DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. 446 A.2d 1036
(R.I. 1982)(denying relief to decedents of plaintiff who had hung
himself imitating a stunt for fear of censoring broadcast media).
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persons over whom the producers have no control." 97
Furthermore, under a simple negligence theory, pro-
ducers would be required to predict public reaction
to their films, creating, in effect, a "heckler's veto" 8
of a producer's right to free speech.99
2. Liability Upheld: Say It At Your Own Risk
On the other hand, some courts have imposed lia-
bility despite First Amendment guarantees. In
Weirum v. RKO General,"'0 a radio station was
held liable for the death of a motorist forced off the
highway by a listener to the defendant's radio station
that was conducting a contest rewarding the first lis-
tener to locate the disc jockey."' Where the issue
was civil accountability for the foreseeable results of
a broadcast that created an undue risk of harm, the
court concluded that "the First Amendment does not
sanction the infliction of physical injury merely be-
cause it was achieved by word rather than act."' 0 2
Similarly, in Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Mag-
azine,"13 the plaintiff sued to recover for personal in-
juries suffered as a result of several murder attempts
on his life made by men whose services were ob-
tained by an advertisement placed in Soldier of For-
tune ("SoF") magazine.'0 4 The court rejected the
magazine's claim that its advertisements were abso-
9' Bill, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1008. Producers would have to
forewarn viewers as to the content of their movie, which might
deter some viewers from attending the movie. Additionally, pro-
ducers would have to provide security at great cost. Each of these
actions would have a chilling effect upon the selection of subject
matter for movies. Id.
9 The First Amendment means that "when speech is of
such a nature as to arouse violent reaction on the part of the
lawless, the first obligation of government is to maintain the
peace and enforce the law, and not to silence or punish the
speaker." Id.
99 I-d.
100 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
101 Id. at 37-38.
102 Id. at 40. The court determined that the record supported
a finding of foreseeability, which in turn, supported a finding of
a duty by the radio station to the plaintiff. Foreseeability was
premised on the facts that it was summer, minors were out of
school, and there was a monetary prize. It was foreseeable that
defendant's youthful listeners would race after the disc jockey in
disregard of highway safety. The court further ruled out the
possibility that a third party could break the chain of liability
where the reckless conduct by minors was a foreseeable result of
the broadcast and contest. Id.
103 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
104 Id. at 1397. The advertisements read:
GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year-old-professional mercenary
desires jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discreet and very private.
Bodyguard, courier, and other special skills. All jobs con-
lutely privileged by the First Amendment.' 5 The
court pointed out that:
The First Amendment does not confer an absolute right to
I . . publish, without responsibility, whatever one may
choose. . . . [Tihe First Amendment's guaranty of free
speech and press carry with them something in the nature
of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected rights respon-
sibly. . . . It does no violence to the value of freedom of
speech ... to impose a duty of reasonable care upon those
who would exercise such freedoms .... 106
Despite the conclusion that the advertisement was
commercial speech entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, the court held it could be forbidden and reg-
ulated.' 0 7 The court thus upheld liability, emphasiz-
ing that "if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the conse-
quences of his own temerity" in publishing the ad-
vertisements that led to the injuries.' 8
B. The Soldier of Fortune Controversy: Setting a
Standard
The First Amendment does not protect commer-
cial speech "related to" illegal activity because there
would be no constitutional interest in any action that
solicits criminal conduct.' 9 Nevertheless, in the in-
stance of magazine publishing, much like broadcast-
sidered. Phone (615) 891-3306 (1-03).
GUN FOR HIRE: NAM sniper instructor. SWAT. Pis-
tol, rifle, security specialist, body guard, courier plus. All
jobs considered. Privacy guaranteed. Mike (214) 756-5941
(101).
Id. at 1398
Query, whether a man bent on crime would publish a solicita-
tion to murder along with his name and phone number in a
magazine read by 60,000 law enforcement officials.
105 Id. at 1398. The defendants claim that if it is determined
that the advertisements are legal, then "irrespective of the conse-
quences flowing from them, [they] are absolutely privileged by
reason of the provisions of the ... First Amendment." Id.
10 Id. at 1400.
107 The court further determined that injury was foreseeable
where a magazine publisher "allowed an advertisement for a
'gun for hire' by a 'professional mercenary,' and a 'NAM sniper
instructor' who would keep all inquiries 'discreet and very pri-
vate'. . . ." Id. at 1402.
108 Id. at 1402 (quoting 34 W. Blackstone Commentaries at
1326). The victim in this instance was not requesting curtail-
ment of the magazine's speech by a prior restraint or censorship.
The victim was requesting damages "caused by the magazine's
exercise of its free speech right" that led to his injuries. 94
A.L.R. FED. 26, at 37 (1989).
109 Although "related to" is the language used by the court,
a stringent interpretation of such a term would be overbroad in
that it would apply with equal force to an advertisement for a
gun to be used in self defense from rape or murder. See Central
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ing, if state tort law places too heavy a burden on
publishers with respect to the advertisements they
print, the fear of liability might impermissibly im-
pose a form of self-censorship on the publishers.
Two Soldier of Fortune magazine cases specifically
address the tender balance between the State's inter-
est in providing recourse for harm caused by an ad-
vertisement and its duty of protecting expression
under the First Amendment.
In Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune,"0 John Wayne
Hearn shot and killed Sandra Black at the behest of
her husband Robert Black who contacted Hearn
through a classified advertisement Hearn had placed
in SoF. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's"' finding for the plain-
tiff, holding that the verdict was flawed because as a
matter of tort law, the district court had demanded
too high a standard of conduct.' 2 The appeals court
reasoned that the facially innocuous advertisement
did not indicate that the illegal activity was foresee-
able and the publisher could not be held accountable
for an ambiguous advertisement. Therefore, it con-
cluded liability would not be found without "a more
specific indication of illegal intent.""1
3
Three years later, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)(holding that the First Amendment
does not protect commercial speech "related to illegal activity");
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973). In Pittsburgh Press, the Court
found no constitutional interest in publishing personal service
advertisements that solicit criminal activity. "We have no doubt
that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a
want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes."
Id.
11 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1024 (1990). Specifically, the advertisement stated:
EX-MARINES-67-69 'Nam Vets, Ex-DI, weapons spe-
cialist-jungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk assignments,
U.S. or overseas. (404) 991-2684.
Id. at 831.
Sandra Black's mother and son sued Soldier of Fortune for
wrongful death, alleging that the magazine negligently published
the advertisement without investigating its nature. Id. at 832.
SOF argued that even if the advertisement was commercial
speech, since it did not facially express illegal activity, it was
constitutionally protected. Id. at 834, n.l. Thus, whether it was
commercial or core speech, the result would be the same.
111 The district court held that the correct standard for eval-
uating the magazine's conduct was whether the publisher "knew
or should have known of the nature of the advertisement and,
thus, should have foreseen the likelihood that criminal conduct
would ensue." Id. at 833. The jury found that not only did SoF's
negligence amount to "conscious indifference," it was also the
proximate cause of Sandra Black's death. Id. The jury awarded
the plaintiffs $1.9 million in compensatory damages and $7.5
Appeals in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune14 held that
the imposition of tort liability on SoF for its breach
of duty to refrain from publishing an advertisement
that facially presented substantial danger of harm to
the public did not violate the First Amendment.?1 5 In
Braun, like Eimann, the murder victim's sons
brought a wrongful death action against SoF alleg-
ing that it had negligently published a personal ser-
vice advertisement.
The district court held SoF liable by finding "the
advertisement[,] on its face[,] would have alerted a
reasonably prudent publisher to the clearly identifi-
able unreasonable risk of harm to the public that the
advertisement posed." ' 6 On appeal, SoF argued that
the First Amendment forbids placing liability on a
publisher unless it openly solicits criminal activity.
Furthermore, it contended that imposing liability on
publishers for advertisements they print indirectly
threatens core non-commercial speech."' The Elev-
enth Circuit disagreed, stating that the First Amend-
ment permits a state to impose liability upon a pub-
lisher where the advertisement facially and "without
the need for investigation, makes it apparent that
there is a substantial danger of harm to the pub-
lic." ' 8 The court based that finding on law estab-
million in punitive damages. Id.
112 Eimann, 880 F.2d at 838. The district court's standard of
care imposed too heavy a burden in that it allowed liability if a
reasonable publisher concluded that the advertisement could be
reasonably interpreted as an offer to commit a crime. Id. at 837.
As observed by the Fifth Circuit, "virtually anything might in-
volve illegal activity and that applying the district court's stan-
dard would mean that a publisher 'must reject all [ambiguous]
advertisements' or risk liability for any 'untoward consequences
that flow from his decision to publish' them." Braun v. Soldier
of Fortune, 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 61
U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1993)(citing Eimann, at 837,
838).
113 Eimann, 880 F.2d at 838. The Fifth Circuit clearly
feared the chilling effect on speech that would occur if a pub-
lisher was held liable for every advertisement that it published
that reasonably could be found to cause injury. Id.
114 Braun, 968 F.2d at 1110.
115 Id.
Id. at 1115. The district court began its examination by
finding a duty by SOF to refrain from publishing advertisements
that contain a "clearly identifiable unreasonable risk." Id. An
offer in the advertisement to commit a serious violent crime, in-
cluding murder, would comport with the district court's stan-
dard. Id. The district court then relied on the balancing test set
forth in United States v. Caroll, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947), to balance Georgia's interest in compensating victims for
tortious conduct with the First Amendment concern that state
law not chill protected speech. Id. at 1115.
1 Id. at 1114-15, 1118.
118 Id. at 1119.
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lished in Gertz v. Robert Welch," 9 which held that
as long as a state does not impose liability without
fault, it may hold a publisher liable for "defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual.1 120 By
analogy, the court in Braun found that a negligence
standard satisfied the First Amendment concerns for
non-commercial and core speech in stating,
[t]he absence of a duty requiring publishers to in-
vestigate the advertisements they print and the re-
quirement that the substance of the ad[vertisement]
itself must warn the publisher of a substantial dan-
ger of harm to the public guarantee that the burden
placed on publishers will not impermissibly chill
protected commercial speech.121
With similar factual scenarios in Eimann and
Braun, why two different results? The answer lies in
the differing jury instructions. In Eimann, the jury
instructions allowed the jury to impose liability if a
reasonable publisher would conclude that the adver-
tisement could be reasonably interpreted as an offer
to commit a crime.'2 2 Conversely, in Braun, the jury
could find liability only if the advertisement facially
created a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk of
harm to the public.'21 Eimann's jury instruction was
deemed too broad by the court in that it would allow
a finding of liability for ambiguous commercial
speech. The appellate court in Eimann rejected plac-
ing a burden on publishers to investigate ambiguous
advertisements and thus, SoF was not held liable.
However, the jury instruction in Braun requiring a
publisher to be alert to certain advertisements was
upheld by the court and SoF was held liable.
C. Setting Precedents for the Future
The issue of third party liability for speech that
causes harm is presently being tested in Congress
119 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
120 Id. at 347.
121 Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119.
122 Eimann, 880 F.2d at 833.
12 Braun, 968 F.2d at 1115.
124 S. 1521, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
125 Donn Fry, Banned Books Week Focuses On Censor-
ship's Sorry Chapters, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 28, 1992, at
C-3.
126 S. 1521, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
127 Maria Puent, Bill holds porn producers liable for sex




131 Chuck Philips, Testing the Limits; The Fatal Shooting
of a Texas Trooper During a Routine Traffic Stop Sets Up a
and in a district court in Austin, Texas. With the
closing of the 102nd Congress, the Pornography Vic-
tim's Compensation Act of 1991 ("Compensation
Act")' 24 died without coming to a final vote. How-
ever, as a bill with great support and five years in
the making it is extremely likely to reemerge with
the new Congress.' 25
The Compensation Act authorized civil suits
against producers or distributors of material, includ-
ing books, films and videos, that inspire foreseeable
sexual assaults.2 6 Supporters maintain that the
Compensation Act is analogous to product liability
law-"[i]f you put out a product that harms some-
one, you're liable."' 27 Opponents, however, argue
that distributors of pornographic materials, like dis-
tributors of guns, tobacco and alcohol, should be free
from liability for the acts of third parties using their
products. 28 Opponents believe that to hold produc-
ers and distributors of pornography liable would
chill protected speech 129 because fear of civil damage
suits would inevitably shrink public access to consti-
tutionally protected products.' 30
The same issue is simultaneously evolving in a
suit in Texas where a nineteen year-old male shot
and killed a police officer during a routine stop.' 3 '
Upon a verdict in the pending criminal suit against
the defendant, the officer's wife, Linda Sue David-
son, has also filed a civil suit against Interscope
Records and Time-Warner, accusing them of gross
negligence for distributing a record that she believes
"incited lawlessness" that lead to her husband's
murder.1
3 2
If the magazine publisher in Braun were analo-
gized to Interscope or Time-Warner as record dis-
tributor or producer, and a jury instruction similar
to the one used in Braun were employed, a court
could possibly find the defendants negligent.'33 Da-
vidson's suit, Braun, and the Compensation Act im-
Conflict Over the Words in a Rap Song that May Wind Up
Testing the Limits, Los ANGELES TIMES, October 13, 1992, at
F-1.
In his criminal conviction, Howard is arguing for leniency,
alleging that he was provoked by the rap music he was listening
to when he pulled the trigger. Id. Howard was listening to
"Soulja's Story" by rapper Tupac Amaru Shakur. The lyrics al-
legedly to blame for the officer's death were as follows:
Cops on my tail, so I bail till I dodge them, They finally
pull me over and I laugh, Remember Rodney King And I
blast his punk ass Now I got a murder case ...... What
the fuck would you do? Drop them or let them drop you?
I choose droppin' the cop!
Id.
132 Id.
13. Although in past instances, controversial perform-
ers-including Ozzy Osbourne and Judas Priest-have been not
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ply the scope of third party liability for speech that
harms may well be expanding.
III. HATE SPEECH ORDINANCES AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: BURN A
CROSS IN THE NAME OF SPEECH
A. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota'34
Thus far, two examples have been presented of
limitations that restrict the First Amendment's reach
in the name of compelling governmental interests.
However, the First Amendment gained new ground
in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul In that case, the de-
fendant, R.A.V., allegedly burned a cross on a black
family's front lawn and was subsequently charged
under St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance. 35 The ordinance provided that,
[w]hoever places on public or private property a
symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graf-
fiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, re-
ligion or gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.13
R.A.V. moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that
the ordinance was overbroad, impermissibly content-
based and thus invalid under the First Amend-
ment."3 7 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court adopted a "content-based" analysis and held
the city ordinance unconstitutional because the gov-
ernment attempted to single out expression on disfa-
vored topics such as race, while offering no protec-
tion to other disfavored subjects.'" 8 The ordinance
was found facially unconstitutional because it pro-
hibited otherwise permitted speech solely on the ba-
sis of the subjects the speech addressed.' 39 The Court
been held liable when accused of being responsible for acts of
third parties. Id.
'3' 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
Id. at 2541 (citing St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02
(1990)).
136 Id. at 2541.
137 Id.
136 Id. at 2547. In R.A.V., the ordinance "applie[d] only to
'fighting words' that insult, or provoke violence, 'on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender'" . . . yet allowed "displays
containing abusive invective ... unless they are addressed to one
of the specified disfavored topics." Id. at 2547. Abusive invective
regarding one's sexual or political orientation, a disability, an-
cestry or national origin would therefore not be afforded any
protection. Id.
13' Id. at 2542. The Court held the ordinance went "beyond
declined to create a new category of proscribable
speech-"hate speech"-as had been done to pro-
hibit fighting words and obscenity. 40 Instead, the
Court explicitly stated that the "government may not
regulate use based on hostility-or favorit-
ism-towards the underlying message expressed.'
4'
Thus, the Court held that the First Amendment im-
poses "a 'content discrimination' limitation upon a
State's prohibition of [even] proscribable speech.'
42
Content-based regulations of speech, like the St.
Paul ordinance, are seen as an attempt to censor or
restrict a message for its underlying ideas. Govern-
mental censorship of that type is presumptively inva-
lid unless the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest. 4 Because there rarely
exists a compelling state interest in censorship, re-
strictions on speech viewed under such strict scrutiny
are usually invalidated. Therefore, to save the St.
Paul ordinance, the Court in R.A.V. examined it
within the context of two exceptions to the presump-
tive prohibition on content discrimination.
Under the first exception, the Court held that no
danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination is thought
to exist when "the basis for the content discrimina-
tion consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable."' 44 The
Court reasoned that the St. Paul ordinance failed to
fall within that first exception. 14 The Court found
that "fighting words are categorically excluded from
the protection of the First Amendment ... [because]
their content embodies a particularly intolerable
(and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing
whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.' 46 By
proscribing words that communicate messages of ra-
cial, gender, or religious intolerance, the city of St.
Paul sought to handicap particular ideas.'14 Had St.
Paul "singled out an especially offensive mode of ex-
pression . . . for example, . . . prohibit[ing] only
mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination."
Id. at 2547.
14' The Court recognized that "[clontent-based regulations
are presumptively invalid," Id. at 2542 (quoting Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991)), unless they fall within
one of the previously recognized categorical exceptions such as
fighting words or obscenity. R.A.V., at 2543.
141 Id. at 2545.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2549.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 2545.
146 Id. at 2549.
147 Id. The Court further noted that "St. Paul's comments




those fighting words that communicate ideas in a
threatening (as opposed to merely obnoxious) man-
ner," '148  the ordinance might have been held
constitutional.
The ordinance also failed the second exception
which stated that if the subclass of proscribable
speech is "associated with particular 'secondary ef-
fects' of the speech, . . . the regulation is justified
without reference to the content of the
speech."' 49 In St. Paul, the Court clarified that
"[l]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of
'secondary effects' we referred to."' 50 The Court
found further that "[t]he emotive impact of speech on
its audience was not considered a 'secondary
effect.' "' '
Failing those two alternative methods of uphold-
ing the ordinance, the Court applied a "strict scru-
tiny" standard. And although the government inter-
est in protecting families from racially motivated
cross-burning on their lawn is a compelling state in-
terest, a content-based ordinance that proscribes
speech ("the means") was not narrowly tailored to
meet that end. Many other ways existed to proscribe
offensive actions such as cross burning and display-
ing a Nazi swastika that would not censor the un-
derlying message. In the present instance, the Court
contended that R.A.V. could have been charged
under any number of criminal statutes including a
statute for arson, property damage, threats of terror-
ism or racially motivated assault.' 52 Those statutes
would have punished R.A.V.'s criminal activity, yet
preserved his constitutional right to free speech.
Thus, the St. Paul ordinance was deemed
unconstitutional. 53
148 Id.
149 Id. at 2546 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
15 Id. at 2549 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988)).
151 Id. at 2549.
151 Id. at 2541. Other Minnesota statutes that would have
punished R.A.V.'s crime include an arson statute (Minn. Stat.
§ 609.713(1) (1987) providing for up to five years in prison; a
criminal damage to property statute (Minn. Stat. § 609.563)
providing for up to five years and a $10,000 fine, depending on
the value of the property intended to be damaged; a threat of
terrorism statute (Minn. Stat. § 609.595 (Supp. 1992)) provid-
ing for up to one year and a $3,000 fine, depending on the ex-
tent of the damage to the property; and a racially motivated as-
sault statute (Minn. Stat. § 609.2231(4) (1990 Supp.)). Id. at
2541 nn. 1-2.
153 Id. at 2550.
15' 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Doe, a graduate
psychology major, feared possible sanctions under the University
B. Application of R.A. V. to University "Hate
Speech" Codes
One future import of R.A.V. is its application to
university regulatory speech codes that are prolifer-
ating nationwide. Two such codes were struck down
prior to the decision in R.A.V. The courts in Doe v.
University of Michigan"" and UMW Post, Inc. v.
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin.55
expressly held that universities are restricted by the
First Amendment in their regulation of the content
of speech. The university, at best, may use narrow
time, place, and manner restrictions, or may promul-
gate codes that model already proscribable speech ra-
tionales like the obscenity or fighting words doc-
trines.156 R.A.V. took established precedent one step
further. R.A.V. affirmed, in the hate speech context,
the First Amendment principle that content-based
discrimination is presumptively invalid. While the
majority of hate speech codes include a list of what
will and will not be protected, under the R.A.V. ra-
tionale, any such list will be invalid. R.A.V. elimi-
nates the need to rely on limiting constructions and
the like, giving courts a powerful tool for striking
content-based regulations.
C. Penalty Enhancement Provisions Also Face an
Uncertain Future
Not only will R.A.V. likely influence city ordi-
nances and university hate speech codes that attempt
to regulate the content of speech, but the ruling will
also affect enhancement penalty provisions as well.
Presently, there is a split among state supreme courts
regarding the validity of such provisions. In State v.
Wyant,"' the Ohio State Supreme Court invalidated
of Michigan's newly adopted policy on discriminatory harass-
ment of students for a discussion of biologically based differences
among races and sexes. Id. at 858.
"' 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). University system's
rule prohibiting students from directing discriminatory epithets
at individuals based on certain characteristics with the intent to
demean them was challenged. Id. at 1164-1168.
156 See supra notes 154 and 155.
15 597 N.E. 2d 450 (1992), petition for cert. filed, (Sept. 29,
1992). Here, two white couples ran a black couple off a state
park campsite when the black couple complained about the loud
music of the white campers. Id. at 450. The white campers
called the black campers "nigger" and said that they ought to be
shot. Id. The Ohio statute that was invalidated following the de-
cision set forth in R.A.V. states that "[n]o person shall [commit
aggravated menacing, menacing, criminal damaging or endan-
gering, or criminal mischief or certain types of telephone harass-
ment] by reason of the race, color, religion, or national origin of
another person or group of persons." Id. at 453.
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a statute allowing stiffer penalties for people who
victimize persons based on race, color, religion or na-
tional origin.158 The court struck down the statute,
finding that it was "clearly aimed at punishment of
bigoted thought."159 Similarly, the court in State v.
MitcheP' struck down a Wisconsin statute that in-
cluded a penalty enhancement provision in an intim-
idation statute, finding that the "statute punished the
defendants's biased thought."' 61 The court further
found that "the statute punished speech, because the
element of discriminatory selection of the victim is
generally prove[n] by evidence of the defendant's
speech."'61 2 Mitchell awaits argument in the United
States Supreme Court where the question presented
will be, "Does [the] First Amendment prohibit states
from providing greater maximum penalties for
crimes if fact-finder determines that criminal of-
fender intentionally selected his or her crime victim
because of victim's race, color, religion or other spec-
ified status?"' 6 The ruling may affect federal legis-
lation including the Federal Hate Crimes Law
passed by the House in October and expected to be
enacted this coming year.1'6 The decision will also
bear heavily on thirty states that have similar pen-
alty enhancement provisions for crimes motivated by
the victim's race, religion or sexual orientation.1
6 5
Conversely, Oregon v. Plowman'66 upheld a stat-
ute that included a penalty enhancement provision.
The Oregon court distinguished its statute from the
one struck down in Wisconsin, concluding that the
Oregon statute was a "law directed against conduct,
not a law directed against the substance of
speech."16 7 Because that type of statute was not con-
The United States Supreme Court declined to act on Wyant
on December 14, 1992, likely because they will decide Mitchell
first.
158 Id.
... Id. at 463. The court noted that "conduct motivated by
racial or religious bigotry can be constitutionally punished under
the criminal code without resort to constructing a thought
crime." Id.
160 485 N.W.2d 807 (1992). In Mitchell, a fourteen year-old
white boy was severely beaten by ten black youths who had just
viewed the movie "Mississippi Burning." Id. Following the film,
Todd Mitchell said, "Do you feel hyped up to move on some
white people? ... There goes a white boy, go get him." Id., at
809. The racial motive in Mitchell's crime doubled his sentence
from two years (the maximum sentence for aggravated battery)
to four years because of the anti-bias statute with an enhanced
penalty provision. Id. This case will be reviewed by the Supreme
Court in the spring. State v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992)
161 Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809 n.1. The Wisconsin statue
increased penalties for certain underlying crimes where the actor
"[i]ntentionally select[ed] the person against whom the crime ...
is committed ... because of the race, religion, color, disability,
sidered in R.A.V. nor in State v. Mitchell, the court
in Oregon upheld its constitutionality.
Although R.A.V. did not directly address univer-
sity codes or enhancement penalty provisions, the de-
cision strongly suggested that both types of regula-
tions may be unconstitutional where they require or
enhance punishment based on a person's thought or
expression.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the First Amendment's guarantees of free
speech and free press, these rights are in constant
tension with the government's obligation to protect
citizens from substantial harm. Weighing First
Amendment guarantees against government interests
often leads to a reduction in First Amendment rights
as exemplified by the restrictions recently placed on
broadcast indecency and on a magazine's third party
liability. Sometimes, however, the balance struck
leads to the expansion of First Amendment limits, as
in R.A. V.
First Amendment rights are constitutional rights
of the highest priority. A dee jay's right to speak
freely, a magazine's right to publish without fear
and an individual's right to express even unpopular
opinions ensures that our freedoms of speech and
press are preserved. Such First Amendment guaran-
tees should not be overcome except in those rare in-
stances in which the government interest is clear,
narrow and overwhelming.
Ilene R. Penn
sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person."
Id.
162 Id.
163 61 U.S.L.W. 3431 (Dec. 15, 1992).
164 Joan Biskupic, Justices to Review 'Hate Crimes' Case:
Ruling Could Affect Numerous Laws, Proposed Federal Legis-
lation, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1992, at A-4.
165 Id. Hate crime legislation first emerged in Massachusetts
in the late 1970s. Nancy E. Roman, High Court to Review Wis-
consin Hate-Crime Law, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A-3.
It increased in the 1980s. Today, forty-six states have some form
of hate crime legislation. Id.
IS 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992), petition for cert. filed, (Nov.
23, 1992).
167 Id. at 565. Relying on a point made in R.A.V., the Ore-
gon court distinguishes its statute from Minnesota's, "[wihere
the government does not target conduct on the basis of its ex-
pressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely be-
cause they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy." R.A. V.,
112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546-47 (1992). The Oregon court also distin-
guished its statute from Wisconsin's holding that the Oregon
statue required two or more people act together. Id.
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